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In this essay, we examine the assumptions underlying natural science, social science, and
the humanities. More speciﬁcally, we suggest that social science in general and leisure
science in particular be guided by a different set of assumptions than those guiding
natural science and the humanities. Drawing on the Aristotelian idea of phronesis,
we propose that value rationality more so than instrumental rationality guide social
scientiﬁc inquiry, and that social science in general, and leisure science in particular,
be viewed as a bridge between natural science and the humanities.
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In The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom (1987) characterizes natural science, social
science, and the humanities as the big three that rule the academic roost and determine
what we consider knowledge to be. He goes on to suggest a pecking order led by natural
science, with social science and the humanities squawking over who gets to perch on
the second rung. According to Bloom, natural science knows what it is doing. It has its
epistemological act together, and there is general agreement about how natural scientists
should go about their work. The fruits of their labor have made us healthier, wealthier, and
wiser, at least insofar as it comes to understanding how the physical world works and how
to take advantage of that understanding in service of humankind.
“But where natural science ends,” Bloom (1987) continues, “trouble begins. It ends at
man, the one being outside of its purview, or to be exact, it ends at that part or aspect of
man that is not body, whatever that may be” (p. 356). The problem, as Bloom sees it, is that
while the body is the purview of natural science, studying that part of us that is not body
is claimed by both social science and the humanities. The difference between them is that

social science wants to believe human beings are predictable while the humanities say we
are not.
The result has been two continuous and ill-assorted strands of thought about man,
one tending to treat him essentially as another of the brutes, without spirituality,
soul, self, consciousness, or what have you; the other acting as though he is not
an animal or does not have a body. (p. 358)
Bloom winds down his assessment of the big three by observing that “while both social
science and the humanities are more or less willingly awed by natural science, they have
a mutual contempt for one another, the former looking down on the latter as unscientiﬁc,
the latter regarding the former as philistine. They do not cooperate” (p. 357). This is
unfortunate, Bloom concludes, because social science and the humanities “occupy much
of the same ground” (p. 357).
Our purpose in writing this essay is to explore this “same ground” occupied by social
science and the humanities to see if we might be able to rid ourselves of any “mutual
contempt” and replace it with a more constructive sentiment. We enter the discourse as
three social scientists who feel caught in between the concreteness of natural science that
addresses questions of what “is” and the ﬂuidity of the humanities that address questions
of what “ought” to be (Schumacher, 1978). Ultimately, we want to better understand the
differences among the “is,” “ought,” and “in between” so that we might better appreciate
and value the scholarship carried out in the name of natural science, social science, the
humanities, and, more particularly, in the name of leisure science.

The Pretensions of Social Science
Much has been written about social science’s attempt to emulate natural science. Indeed,
Bloom traces this effort back to the Enlightenment when that part of us that is not body was
ejected from nature and hence from natural science and natural philosophy. Social science
picked up the challenge to assimilate our invisible selves into the new natural science and
to treat the science of humankind as “the next rung in the ladder down from biology”
(Bloom, 1987, p. 358). Meanwhile, the humanities have gone their separate ways in trying
to understand our humanness. They have employed different methods and come to different
conclusions as to why we humans act the way we do. “Neither challenged the champion,
natural science,” Bloom contends. Rather, “social science tried humbly to ﬁnd a place at
court, humanities proudly to set up shop next door” (p. 358).
Social science’s adoption of the assumptions and methods of natural science has yielded
mixed results (see Hemingway, 1990, for a critique of this attempt in leisure science). While
certain of its branches, such as economics and psychology, have demonstrated modest
predictive power, social science in general has not. The failure of social science to deliver the
same cause and effect certitude about our invisible selves that natural science has delivered
about our physical selves has generated mounting criticism of the underlying assumptions
and methods governing the conduct of social science. Flyvbjerg (2001) summarizes the
essence of this criticism in Making Social Science Matter, in which he discusses the failings
of social science’s aping of natural science. He also considers social science’s promise if
governed by a different set of assumptions leading to the employment of different methods
of discovery and analysis to address scientiﬁc questions that are ill-suited for natural science.
Essentially, Flyvbjerg reasons that social science will never be able to derive contextindependent theories that explain human behavior in the same way natural science has
derived context-independent theories to explain the workings of the physical world. This is

due, in part, to the self-reﬂexive nature of what social scientists study; that is, the objects
of interest to social science are subjects with their own interpretations of themselves and
events which are often inconsistent and highly contextualized. They defy generalization in
the abstract. The upshot of Flyvbjerg’s analysis is that social science is doomed to second
class citizenship as long as it insists on mimicking the assumptions and methods of natural
science. Social science cannot deliver the cumulative epistemic understanding that natural
science can because it is trying to come to grips with a fundamentally different subject
matter. To compare the contributions of social science with natural science along epistemic
lines is thus rendered futile, and if perpetuated without critical review, social science is
bound to come up short.
Flyvbjerg’s remedy for the misguided pretensions of social science is to adopt a
new set of assumptions and methods for addressing questions that natural science is illequipped to answer, questions that are based on value rationality rather than instrumental
rationality. Value rationality and instrumental rationality can be thought of as different
means-ends processes. Both types of rationality involve consciousness and planning; their
main difference is that value rationality focuses on the value of the ends it seeks to reach,
asking why an act is ultimately of value, and less on the means to get there or the questions
of how to reach the end. Instrumental rationality, on the other hand, considers questions
of how to reach an end but not so much why, or the value of the ends it seeks to reach. In
Flyvbjerg’s view, value rationality means “the purpose of social science is not to develop
theory, but to contribute to society’s practical rationality in elucidating where we are, where
we want to go, and what is desirable according to a diverse set of interests” (2001, p. 167).
Flyvbjerg legitimizes these questions as worthy of social scientiﬁc inquiry by anchoring
them in Aristotle’s idea of phronesis.

Phronesis
Phronesis is a “true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are
good or bad for man” (Aristotle, as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 2). Phronesis is practical
wisdom involving judgments and decisions. Aristotle’s phronesis contributes to the “re
ﬂexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an
enlightened political, economic, and cultural development in any society, and which is at
the core of phronesis” (Flyvbjerg, p. 3). To Aristotle, the “most important task of social
and political studies was to develop society’s value rationality vis-à-vis its scientiﬁc and
technical rationality. Aristotle did not doubt that the ﬁrst type of rationality was the most
important and ought to inﬂuence the second” (p. 53). As Flyvbjerg points out, however,
since the Enlightenment phronesis has receded into the background as instrumental ratio
nality has taken over as the dominant position informing science. What this means is that
“is” questions have been addressed by science largely uninformed by “ought” questions.
Stated differently, value questions have been deemed to be outside the purview of science.
Bronowski’s (1965) Science and Human Values provides a clear illustration of where this
can lead when he describes the building of the atomic bomb with little forethought given to
the moral question associated with dropping it. When it comes to just who was responsible
for the atomic bomb, Bronowski asks in the words of a popular dance tune of the day,
“Is You Is, or Is You Ain’t Ma Baby?” (p. 11). Absent any value rationality-guided social
science preceding the weapon’s development, a crucial phronetic question that should have
been asked was not.
This, then, is the role Flyvbjerg sees for social science. While natural science is strong
in epistemic qualities, it is weak in phronetic qualities. And while social science is weak in
epistemic qualities, it is strong in phronetic qualities. Their strengths and weaknesses lay

along different dimensions, and rather than seeing natural and social science as competing
with one another, they, along with the humanities, should be seen as striving to serve
fundamentally different ends.

Toward a More Phronetic Social Science
What might a more phronetic social science look like? A brief review of Aristotle’s three
important forms of intellectual work—episteme, techne, and phronesis—is illustrative.
Episteme can be interpreted as the scientiﬁc ideal based on the promise of universal theories
that explain the physical workings of the world. Techne can be interpreted as applied science,
the practical application of technical knowledge. Phronesis can be interpreted as ethical
deliberation about values related to praxis. They are all necessary to intellectual thought,
and they all should be valued in their own right. But as long as social science continues to
try to emulate natural science, episteme will likely be held up as the scientiﬁc ideal, and
social science will continue to be evaluated in ways patterned after natural science. That,
following Flyvbjerg’s logic, will be counterproductive to what social science can contribute
in the way of phronetic insights about the workings of that part of us that is not body.
From Flyvbjerg’s perspective, the kind of scholarship that matters in social science
need not be theory-based or context-independent as required in natural science. Neither
must it to lead to prediction and control. On the contrary, trying to satisfy the canons of
natural scientiﬁc inquiry is bound to result in ongoing frustration for social scientists. What
is needed instead is a revision of thought about what constitutes scholarship in social science
that reﬂects the phronetic qualities inherent in the social scientiﬁc enterprise. What is needed
is a new appreciation of the intellectual work that goes on in the name of social science that
leads to a better understanding of how value rationality can inform instrumental rationality,
so that in the end we might have a more satisfying answer to Bronowski’s question, “Is You
Is or Is You Ain’t Ma Baby?”
Flyvbjerg goes into great detail describing what good phronetic social science looks
like. He holds up Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton’s (1985) Habits of the
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life as a prime example of phronetic
insight guided by variations of the three value rational questions that characterize the
starting point for classic phronetic inquiry: “Where are we? Where do we want to go?” and
“What is desirable?” As Flyvbjerg describes the book:
Habits of the Heart . . . focuses on values, the authors get close to the people
and phenomena they study, they focus on the minutiae and practices that make up
the basic concerns of life, they make extensive use of case studies in context, they
use narrative as expository technique, and, ﬁnally, their work is dialogical, that is,
it allows for other voices than those of the authors, both in relation to the people
they study and in relation to society at large. The whole point of the study is to
enter into a dialogue with individuals and society and to assist them - after they
have assisted the researchers - in reﬂecting on their values. The aim is to make
moral debate part of public life. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 63)
Again employing Habits of the Heart as his exemplar, Flyvbjerg asserts that the goal of
phronetic inquiry “is to produce input to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society,
rather than to generate ultimate, unequivocally veriﬁed knowledge” (p. 139). Reinforcing
this perspective, Bellah et al. (1985) express their hope that

the reader will test what we say against his or her own experience, will argue with
us when what we say does not ﬁt, and, best of all, will join the public discussion
by offering interpretations superior to ours that can receive further discussion.
(p. 307)
Phronetic social science is thus grounded in praxis, and its aim is to improve praxis. The
methods it employs focus on values, place power at the core of analysis, get close to
reality, emphasize little things, look at practice before discourse, study cases and contexts,
ask “how” as well as “why” employing narrative analysis, join agency and structure, and
dialogue with a polyphony of voices (Flyvbjerg, pp. 129–140). From this perspective, “the
purpose of social science is not to develop theory, but to contribute to society’s practical
rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according
to diverse sets of values and interests” (p. 167). Its aim is to move value rational deliberation
to the forefront of social scientiﬁc thought and action and to apply phronetic insights to the
resolution of real world problems (Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012). There is, then, a
strong imperative for adopting an applied phronesis perspective in leisure science as well.

Toward a More Phronetic Leisure Science
In a provocative essay, Williams (in press) extends Flyvbjerg’s assessment of the promise of
phronetic social science to the context of leisure. Williams begins by exploring the futility
of employing traditional scientiﬁc approaches to seeking solutions to problems faced by
leisure professionals in the ﬁeld because of the “fundamental differences between the nature
of science, which seeks to transcend place, and the nature of practice, which is by necessity
place-based.” In Williams’s view, the age-old science-practice gap is impossible to erase
because traditional science seeks to identify context-independent principles upon which
to base professional practice, whereas practice is always context bound. Science in the
abstract tends not to acknowledge place-based idiosyncrasies, which weakens the utility
of scientiﬁc generalizations when applied to speciﬁc managerial situations. Consequently,
Williams, like Flyvbjerg, sees the need to adopt new ways of thinking about how to conduct
leisure science if it is to better inform praxis.
One of Williams’s main criticisms of leisure science as it has been traditionally con
ducted is its top-down structure. Extrapolating from theory to practice, or what Williams
refers to as taking a “god’s-eye” view of things, has not led to an integrated and cohesive
body of knowledge to guide the work of leisure professionals in the ﬁeld. On the contrary,
theory-based science often obfuscates rather than clariﬁes professional practice, and practi
tioners who hunger for science-based managerial insights are routinely fed a diet of murky
research results, concluding in effect, “It depends.”
Williams’s remedy is to situate social science in the thick of professional practice
rather than hovering above it. By embedding the research process in the places where the
planning, implementation, and evaluation of leisure services unfold, social scientists stand
to beneﬁt from the accumulated wisdom of practitioners while practitioners stand to beneﬁt
from the systematic observations of social scientists. This position of “betweenness” is
at the same time informed by top-down scientiﬁc reasoning while simultaneously being
animated by bottom-up insights from practitioners whose knowledge is embedded in place
(Entrikin, 1991). Leisure science thus becomes a collaborative exercise in collective sensemaking governed by value rationality (see Stewart, Parry, & Glover, 2008, for a similar
interpretation). This is the stuff of Aristotle’s phronesis. It values local, practical knowledge
situated in place as a foundation for developing informed action “guided by the collective
wisdom of networked actors and institutions governing complex systems, each informing

one another in a collaborative form of rationality that operates both horizontally [place to
place] and vertically [upwards and downwards in scale]” (Williams).

Toward a Broader Conception of Scholarship in Leisure Studies
How, then, might we think about what constitutes scholarship in leisure studies? The
differences between natural science, social science, and the humanities suggest a widening
of categories of meaningful contributions. Indeed, leisure studies might better be thought
of as a context for episteme, techne, and phronesis rather than as a particular form of
intellectual work (i.e., episteme). Signiﬁcant inquiry is ongoing in leisure studies in all
three realms. Natural scientists, guided by epistemic principles, examine leisure impacts on
the physical world up to and including the human body (think of David Cole’s body of work
on physical impacts associated with campground and campsite use); social scientists, guided
by techne, apply research results to improve professional practice (think of John Crompton’s
body of work on marketing and pricing of leisure services); and phronetic social scientists
strive to make sense of the meanings and values that self-reﬂexive individuals ascribe to
their leisure experiences (think of Karla Henderson’s body of work on women’s leisure).
Meanwhile, philosophers, poets, novelists, musicians, ﬁlmmakers, and other representatives
of the humanities contribute in their own ways to understanding the meaning of leisure in
our lives. All of this work is important and worthy of consideration and support in higher
education.
In a recent review of related literature, Stewart et al. (2008) suggest that leisure
scientists are gravitating away from a singular epistemic discourse to embrace a multiplicity
of discourses to do justice to their subject matter(s). They underscore the signiﬁcance of
hidden or unexamined values and ideologies that shape and guide leisure science, and they
emphasize the importance of making those values and ideologies explicit in the research
process. Stewart et al. also challenge the leisure research community to rise above the
traditional epistemic perspective to take in a broader view, one that recognizes and honors
a range of different ways of knowing and being. This does not require abandoning the
canons of scientiﬁc inquiry, giving up on theorizing, stopping the search for contextindependent principles, or abandoning the idea of prediction and control as one goal of
scientiﬁc inquiry. It does, however, require acknowledging the limits of the epistemic
perspective and being open to other perspectives that invite leisure scholars to investigate
more thoroughly the importance of context, the self-reﬂexive nature of human beings, and
the impact of pluralistic views on the nature and meaning of life.

Conclusion
What we are calling for is a view of social science in general, and leisure science in
particular, that bridges natural science and the humanities (Goodale, 1990). We think
Aristotle’s phronesis provides that bridge. Moreover, we are also encouraging the leisure
studies community to welcome the humanities into the fold. The kinds of intellectual work
that shed light on the meaning of leisure in our lives are extremely wide-ranging, and when
done well they all constitute good scholarship.
As Bronowski (1965) reminds us, the distinction between art and science is less
pronounced than we commonly think it to be. There is, or ought to be, a kindred spirit
animating all three branches of knowledge. They are, after all, bonded by a mutual interest
in making sense of the world. Social science and the humanities need not be contemptuous
of one another, nor should they be in awe of natural science. Natural science, social science,
and the humanities should celebrate what makes their respective branches of knowledge

unique in addition to what unites them—a common concern for better understanding the
world, not only for the sake of prediction and control but also for the sake of felicity and
for the simple satisfaction that comes with knowing.
Leisure studies, for its part, should honor and reward the intellectual work that is carried
out in the name of episteme, techne, and phronesis, as well as the work that is carried out
in the name of the humanities. Our community of scholars should reﬂect the multiplicity of
ways we come to know and understand the world, and the measure of what we accomplish
together should reside in the coherence of the stories we tell.
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